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NOTES
CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
Resistance to the administrative enforcement of the Wagner
Act" has raised several important issues. At least three major
problems have been involved in cases seeking relief against hear-
ings by the National Labor Relations Board: (1) the application
of the doctrine of "jurisdictional facts" to hearings by the Labor
Board; (2) the effect of allegations of irreparable damage in
suits to enjoin hearings by the Board; (3) the availability of the
declaratory judgment to test the propriety of administrative
action where a prescribed administrative remedy has not been
exhausted by the applicant. The present Note will be concerned
with these three problems.
In the past two and a half years, approximately 95 injunction
suits were filed in the district courts of the United States2 to
restrain the Labor Board from conducting hearings and other
proceedings pursuant to the Wagner Act. Usually coupled with
the prayer for an injunction to prevent irreparable damage was
a request for a declaratory judgment holding the Wagner Act
unconstitutional. In none of these suits, however, was a declara-
tory judgment ever rendered. Since the Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of the Act,3 that prayer has, for the
most part, been abandoned.
Prior to the Supreme Court holding on January 31, 1938, in
Newport News v. Schauffleri 4 and Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp.,5 the majority of the federal district courts (73 of the
95 cases) had denied injunctive relief when the cases were first
presented to them.6 The First Circuit Court of Appeals was the
only court of appeals to support the minority group of district
courts and hold that the district court possessed such equitable
jurisdiction.7 In view of the exclusive procedure8 and remedies
1. (1935) 49 Stat. 449, (1937) 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 153.
2. Second Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board For
The Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1937 (1938) 31.
3. Associated Press v. N. L. R. B. (1937) 301 U. S. 103, 57 S. Ct. 560,
81 L. ed. 953; N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) 301
U. S. 49, 57 S. Ct. 642, 81 L. ed. 893.
4. 58 S. Ct. 459, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 399.
5. 58 S. Ct. 466, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 406.
6. Supra, note 2.
7. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Myers v. Mackenzie et al.
(C. C. A. 1, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 154, affirming (D. C. D. Mass. 1936) 15 F.
Supp. 915, rehearing den. 89 F. (2d) 1000, cert. (1937) 58 S. Ct. 26, 82
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provided in the Wagner Act, the Supreme Court held in the
above-mentioned cases that a federal district court does not have
equitable jurisdiction to enjoin the Labor Board from conducting
a hearing upon a complaint filed by the Board against an em-
ployer allegedly engaged in unfair labor practices prohibited by
the Act.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF "JURISDICTIONAL FACTS"
The Wagner Act grants exclusive power to the Labor Board9
to prevent unfair labor practices "affecting commerce"10 and
defines the latter phrase as meaning "in commerce or burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having
led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce."" The Supreme Court has said that the Act does not
"impose collective bargaining upon all industry regardless of
effects upon interstate or foreign commerce," but rather "pur-
ports to reach only what may be deemed to burden or obstruct
that commerce." 2 Such a qualification of the authority of the
Labor Board preserves the constitutionality of the Act.
In the aforementioned Myers case the corporation contended
that jurisdiction to determine the constitutional question of the
applicability of the Wagner Act is vested in the courts and can-
not be circumvented by statutory enactment.13 Since the cor-
poration denied that it was engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce, and since it claimed that a hearing before the Board would
subject it to irreparable injuries, it took the position that its
L. ed. 11, rev'd (1938) 58 S. Ct. 459, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 299. The circuit
courts of appeal which held such jurisdiction did not lie were: Alexander
Smith & Sons Carpet Co. v. Herrick (C. C. A. 2, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 16;
Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v. Schauffler (C. C. A. 4, 1937) 91 F.(2d) 730, affirming (D. C. E. D. Va. 1937) C. C. H. Labor Service, par.
18,009, cert. (1937) 58 S. Ct. 43, aff'd (1938) 58 S. Ct. 466, 58 L. ed.(adv. op.) 406; Bradley Lumber Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84
F. (2d) 97, cert. den. (1936) 299 U. S. 559, 57 S. Ct. 21, 81 L. ed. 441;
Bowen v. James Vernor Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 968 (reversing
district court decision); Beman v. Bendix Product Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1937)
89 F. (2d) 661, rev'g (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 58; Eagle-Picher
Lead Co. v. Madden (C. C. A. 10, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 661, reversing (D. C.
N. D. Ill. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 58; Beman v. Iowa Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1937)
90 F. (2d) 249 (reversing district court decision) ; Beaver Mills v. Madden(App. D. C. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 862, cert. den. (1937) 300 U. S. 672, 57
S. Ct. 611, 81 L. ed. 878.
8. Sec. 10 (a-f), (h).
9. Sec. 10 (a).
10. Ibid.
11. Sec. 2 (7).
12. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) 301 U. S. 1, 31,
57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893; supra, note 4.
13. Supra, note 5.
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constitutional rights would be violated unless the district court
assumed jurisdiction to enjoin the holding of a hearing by the
Labor Board. 14
This contention was based upon the decision in Crowell v.
Benson-1 requiring review de novo of jurisdictional facts found
by an administrative agency. The corporation, however, was
urging the extension of the Crowell v. Benson principle to a new
type of case. Independent judicial determination of jurisdictional
facts was sought here prior to the administrative proceeding and
not, as in Crowell v. Benson, upon appeal from the administra-
tive decision.
The Supreme Court in the Myers case said that if such a view
were adopted, it would practically substitute the district court for
the Labor Board as the tribunal to hear and determine that
which Congress had declared that the Board exclusively should
hear and determine in the first instance.16 The doctrine that the
courts will not interfere with administrative action until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted requires
that all such jurisdictional matters be first submitted to the
proper administrative agency.1'7
Whatever may be the extent of the general power of the courts
to determine de novo jurisdictional questions decided by adminis-
trative agencies, and to permit the introduction and consideration
of additional evidence of such issues, it is submitted that there
will be no de novo review of jurisdictional facts determined by
the Labor Board. 18 Any independent judicial review will be
14. The following are a few of the cases cited in support of this con-
tention: Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1919) 253 U. S.
287, 40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. ed. 908; Crowell v. Benson (1932) 285 U. S. 22,
52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. ed. 598; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States
(1935) 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. ed. 1033. See also First Annual
Report of the National Labor Relations Board For The Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1936 (1937) 46-48.
15. (1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. ed. 598. This was a suit
to enjoin the enforcement of an award for personal injury made by a
deputy commissioner under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Act,
(1927) 44 Stat. 1424, (1937) 33 U. S. C. A. secs. 901-905, enacted under
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of Congress. The application of
the statute was predicated on two fundamental limitations: (1) that the
injury took place on navigable water, and. (2) that the relation of employer
and employee existed.
16. Supra, note 5.
17. Ibid.; First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board
For The Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936 (1937) 9; supra, note 2.
18. The various theories as to de novo review of jurisdictional facts
found by the N. L. R. B. may be found in Note (1936) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 884,
925; Legis. (1935) 30 Col. L. Rev. 1098, 1115.
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based solely upon the record19 formulated by the Board. Such
seems to be the inference in the Myers case where the Court
states
* * * if it [the National Labor Relations Board] finds that
interstate or foreign commerce is involved but the Circuit
Court of Appeals concludes that such finding was without
adequate evidence to support it,2o or otherwise contrary to
law,21 the board's petition to enforce it will be dismissed,
or the employer's petition to have it set aside will be
granted.
The application of the rule of Crowell v. Benson will probably
be limited so as not to include the orders of the Labor Board
because the judicial temper of the Supreme Court has changed
since that decision.22 It should also be noticed that provisions of
the Wagner Act as outlined above are similar to the provisions
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.23 As yet the courts have
not applied the Crowell v. Benson principle in any case in which
an order of the Federal Trade Commission was reviewed.
It has been suggested, however, that the accused employer may
raise the question of jurisdictional fact prior to a hearing and
order of the Board by refusing to answer the Board's subpoena
19. The record consists of the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings con-
ducted by the Board. See. 10 (e).
20. Italics supplied. Quaere: Should "adequate" be construed to be the
weight of the evidence or should it be construed to be substantial evidence?
21. The conclusions of the Federal Trade Commission as to what con-
stitutes "unfair methods of competition" have been held to be conclusions
of law and subject to judicial definition. Federal Trade Commission v.
Gratz (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct. 572, 64 L. ed. 993. Although sec. 8
of the Wagner Act enumerates the various "unfair labor practices," they
can similarly be construed by the courts.
22. Crowell v. Benson was a 5-3 decision, in which Mr. Justice Cardozo
did not participate. Since that decision Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr.
Justice Vandevanter who joined in the majority opinion have retired and
have been replaced by Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Black.
23. "Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may claim a review of such
order in the appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals, or in the Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia. It is intended here to give the party
aggrieved a full, expeditious and exclusive method of review in one pro-
ceeding after a final order is made. Until such final order is made the
party is not injured and cannot be heard to complain as has been held in
cases under the Federal Trade Commission Act." H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) part 3, p. 24. See also Hurst v. Federal Trade
Commission (D. C. E. D. Va. 1920) 268 Fed. 874; Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Claire Furnace Co. (1927) 274 U. S. 160, 47 S. Ct. 553, 71 L. ed.
978; Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 8, 1922)
280 Fed. 45.
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to a hearing24 The Board cannot enforce its subpoenas, nor can
it compel an employer to produce documents or books for the
purpose of a hearing. The Board must appeal to a circuit court
of appeals for the enforcement of such orders.25 If the employer
who refuses to answer the subpoena of the Board could prove
that he really is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, the
court would refuse to enforce any such order of the Board.26
Such a bona fide resistance would not come within the penal pro-
visions of the Act.2 7 Although an employer may be able to chal-
lenge the Board's jurisdiction in such a manner, he cannot secure
an injunction against the holding of a hearing by the Board.2 8
IRREPARABLE DAMAGE
It is well settled that judicial relief is not to be granted until
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.1 An
attempt was made in the Myers and Newport News cases to
evade this requirement by alleging that the mere holding of the
prescribed administrative hearing would in itself result in ir-
reparable damage. The allegations of irreparable damage in the
numerous suits to enjoin the Labor Board were generally30 to
the effect that the company would be held up to scorn as a viola-
tor of a federal law and would incur the odium and ill-will of its
employees and the public during the pendency of the proceeding;
that its officials would be compelled to produce documents of a
confidential nature which were irrelevant in so far as the issues
of the hearing were concerned; that the hearing would result
both in a financial loss to the company and the loss of the time
of its officials and employees ;31 that the harmonious relations ex-
24. Bradley Lumber Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84 F. (2d)
97; cf. Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission (1936) 298 U. S. 1, 56
S. Ct. 654; 80 L. ed. 1015.
25. Sec. 11 (2).
26. See. 10 (e).
27. Ibid., sec. 12.
28. Supra, notes 4 and 5. Quaere: may a witness wholly unconnected
with the employer challenge the validity of the jurisdiction of the Board
over the employer?
29. This rule has been applied more often in equity where injunctive
relief was sought. Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corp. Commission(1915) 236 U. S. 699, 35 S. Ct. 480, 59 L. ed. 797; Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Claire Furnace Co. (1927) 274 U. S. 160, 47 S. Ct. 553, 71 L. ed.
978. The rule is applicable to proceedings at law as it is to suits in equity.
First Nat. Bk. v. Board of County Commissioners (1932) 264 U. S. 450,
44 St. Ct. 385, 68 L. ed. 784; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis (1937) 301 U. S.
337, 343, 57 S. Ct. 816, 81 L. ed. 1143.
30. First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board For The
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936 (1937) 47, 48.
31. It was alleged in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1938) 58
S. Ct. 459, 82 L. ed. (adv. op.) 406, that in 1934 and 1935 the predecessor
1938] NOTES
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isting between the corporation and its employees would be seri-
ously impaired; and that the Board's proceedings, regardless of
their outcome, would hinder the company in exercising its rights
to bargain freely with its employees. The Supreme Court said
that the alleged damage was similar to the incidents of an ordi-
nary law suit, and that as yet no way has been devised to relieve
a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish that the
suit is actually groundless.3 2
Although the Supreme Court has taken an authoritative stand
on the issue of irreparable damage when applied to the Labor
Board, it is interesting to note the different approaches adopted
by the lower federal courts toward this issue.33
Some district courts apparently rationalized the granting of
preliminary injunctions against the Labor Board on the "balance
of convenience" theory. Prior to the establishment of the consti-
tutionality of the Wagner Act, they reasoned that whereas the
granting of the injunction would not seriously damage or incon-
venience the Labor Board, the denial of the injunctive relief
might mean certain and irreparable injury to the employer.34
Thus injunctions were issued when it seemed that there would
be no harm in maintaining the status quo until constitutional
questions were settled in order to avoid some otherwise imminent
injury.
Other district courts held that the complainants were entitled
to relief from harassment by government officials and therefore
granted injunctions to prevent irreparable damage.35 Still other
courts, however, held that such harassment was too indirect and
speculative to warrant relief and in no sense constituted irrep-
arable injury.3 This last position was taken by the Supreme
of the present Labor Board instituted somewhat similar action against the
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation. Although the proceedings were even-
tually dismissed, the hearings cost the corporation more than $15,000 and
consumed a total of 2,500 hours of working time of officials and employees.
32. Supra, note 5.
33. Cf. Note, Irreparable Injury In Constitutional Law Cases (1936)
46 Yale L. J. 255.
34. Independent Workers of Clayton Mark & Co. v. Beman (D. C. N. D.
Ill. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 627, (C. C. A. 7, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 59.
35. Bendix Products Corp. v. Beman (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1936) 14 F. Supp.
58, rev'd (C. C. A. 7, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 661; Eagle-Picher Co. v. Madden
(D. C. N. D. OkI. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 407, remanded (1937) 90 F. Supp. 321.
36. Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. Feidelson (D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1936) 13 F.
Supp. 153; Ohio Garment Co. v. Lind (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1936) 13 F. Supp.
877; Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Nylander (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1936)
14 F. Supp. 201; Buchsbaum & Co. v. Beman (D. C. N. D. I11. 1936) 14
F. Supp. 444; John Blood & Co. v. Madden (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1936) 15 F.
Supp. 779; Bradley Lumber Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84 F.
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Court in the Newport News and Myers cases. This position is
conclusive as it affects the National Labor Relations Board. The
Supreme Court may, however, adopt one of the other positions in
regard to some other administrative agency.
It has been said that the irreparable injury concept has been
distorted and abused in constitutional litigation by judges who
are eager to simplify access to the courts by extending the use
of the injunction,. 7 and that the objectives of those who seek a
speedy mode of judicial review might be better and more directly
attained under the federal declaratory judgment statute.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
It will be remembered that coupled with the prayer for injunc-
tive relief in many of the cases considered was a prayer for a
declaratory judgment holding the Wagner Act unconstitutional. 8
The declaratory judgments were denied. This same prayer for
declaratory relief was involved in the Newport News and Myers
cases.39 The question of the availability of a declaratory judg-
ment where a special statutory method was provided has never
been decided by the Supreme Court.
If the district court had determined the jurisdiction of the
Labor Board by declaratory judgment before a hearing by the
Board, the evidence presented to the court would undoubtedly
have been the same as though the Board had determined the ques-
tion of its jurisdiction. No time or expense of the parties would
have been wasted. It must be remembered, however, that the
courts are not authorized to deliver advisory opinions or pro-
nouncements upon abstract questions.40 The Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act 4' does not change the essential requisites for the
exercise of judicial power. It applies only to "cases of actual con-
(2d) 97, 100, "No doubt an investigation may, as the bill asserts, stir up
some feeling among the employees and cause some inconvenience by taking
witnesses from their work, but these things are incident to every sort of
trial and are part of the social burden of living under government. They
are not the irreparable damage which equity will interfere to prevent; and
a suit in equity would not wholly obviate them."
37. Supra, note 33.
38. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Nylander (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1936)
14 F. Supp. 201; Bradley Lumber Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1936)
94 F. (2d) 97.
39. Cf. Wilson & Co. v. Gates (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 247, in which
the Circuit Court of Appeals would not consider the issue of whether
equitable jurisdiction existed to enjoin the N. L. R. B. It also refused to
enter a declaratory judgment declaring the Act unconstitutional, where the
basis of the petition was the invalidity of the Act already held valid by the
Supreme Court.
40. Massachusetts v. Mellon (1922) 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67
L. ed. 1078.
41. (1934) 48 Stat. 955, (1937) 28 U. S. C. A. see. 400.
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troversy" 42 and there must be a justiciable controversy between
real parties upon real issues.43 Moreover, relief under the Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act is a discretionary matter. Where a
special statutory method for the determination of the particular
type of cases has been provided, to permit that issue to be tried
by declaration would be improper. Practically speaking, it would
oust the court of appeals from its exclusive jurisdiction over the
National Labor Relations Board. 44 Congress could not have in-
tended that the Declaratory Judgments Act be employed where,
as in the case of the Wagner Act, a special statutory method for
review is provided. 4- This differs from denying a declaration
merely because a general or common-law remedy could have been
invoked.4
6
The Supreme Court's position in the Myers and Newport News
cases is of great significance in fields of administrative and labor
law. Its effects are already being felt.47 The adverse comment
that the Crowell v. Benson doctrine of "jurisdictional fact" has
received48 would indicate that the Supreme Court was wise in
rejecting this attempt to extend the doctrine.
42. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth (1936) 300 U. S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461,
81 L. ed. 617, 108 A. L. R. 1000; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority
(1935) 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. ed. 688.
43. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Nylander (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1936)
14 F. Supp. 201, 207, the District Court would not consider the prayer for
declaratory judgment because such a judgment is only binding upon the
real parties before the court and the only parties actually named defendant
were the trial examiner, the attorney for the board, and two administrative
subordinates. 3Bradley Lumber Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84
F. (2d) 97, 100; Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis R. R. v. Wallace(1932) 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed. 730.
44. Cf. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (1934) 156; supra, note 8.
45. "The new power to make a declaratory decree does not authorize a
court of equity by declaration to stop or interfere with administrative pro-
ceedings at a point where it would not under settled principles, have inter-
fered with or stopped them under its power to enjoin." Bradley Lumber
Co. v. N. L. R. B. (C. C. A. 5, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 97, 100.
46. Supra, note 44.
47. See The Nevins v. Boland (Feb. 4, 1938) C. C. H. Labor Service,
par. 18,090, 99 N. Y. L. J. 29, p. 590, wherein the New York Supreme Court
held it had no jurisdiction to restrain the New York State Labor Relations
Board from conducting a hearing based on a complaint alleging unfair
labor practices on the part of the petitioning employer, although the em-
ployer has previously begun legal proceedings against the Union which had
filed charges before the Board; Myers v. Cocheco Woolens Mfg. Co. (C. C.
A. 1, Feb. 9, 1938) C. C. H. Labor Service, par. 18,095, rev'g (D. C. D.
N. H. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 788, citing the Newport News and Myers cases
in holding that a federal district court is without jurisdiction to enjoin
proceedings of the N. L. R. B.
48. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative
Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact" (1932) 80 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1055, 1060; Comment (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 738; Comment (1932)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss3/11
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Had the federal district courts been empowered to strike down
the statutory procedure provided in the Wagner Act, the Labor
Board, as an expert body, would have lost a large measure of its
function of initially determining in what instances the Act should
be applied and would have been prevented from applying the Act
to particular factual situations.49
JosEPH KUTTEN.
41 Yale L. J. 1037; Comment (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1312; Note (1933)
46 Harv. L. Rev. 478.
49. First Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board For The
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1936 (1937) 48; quaere: What will be the
effect of sec. 77-B of the Bankruptcy Statute upon the problem of conflict
of jurisdiction between the federal district courts and the National Labor
Relations Board? It has recently been held that a plan of reorganization
which had been approved by all interested parties and was at the stage
of confirmation would not be disturbed by the district court upon applica-
tion of the N. L. I. B. to require the debtor to incorporate certain provi-
sions which would bind the reorganized company. In the Matter of Baldwin
Locomotive Works, Debtor (D. C. E. D. Pa. Feb. 29, 1938) C. C. H. Labor
Service, par. 18,107.
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